July 3, 1995
The sequence of events leading the banking software company Systematics (ALLTEL Information Services) to hire a libel attorney to deny it was operating on behalf of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) began more than a decade ago. In the early 1980s, the War on (Some) Drugs and the War on (Some) Terrorists led to various U.S. government initiatives to "follow the money." A Senate subcommittee recommended that the Treasury Department should work with the "Federal Reserve Board to develop a better understanding of the financial significance and use of currency repatriation data as well as information about foreign depositors' currency deposits." (U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, *Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies*, U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1983.) Over at the National Security Council, Norman A. Bailey, an economist who understood the electronic flow of money through SWIFT, Fedwire, and CHIPS, urged the involve- ment of the National Security Agency (NSA), the Ft. Meade-based Defense Department agency for signals intelligence and communications security. Bailey "confirms that within a few years the National Security Agency . . . had begun vacuuming up mountains of data by listening in on bank wire traffic. It became a joint effort of several Western governments with the Israelis playing a leading role, since they were the main target of terrorism" (James R. Norman, "Fostergate"). The NSA proceeded to jack into Fedwire, CHIPS, and Swift. Doing so would be a priority if the aim was to monitor banking transactions. But even while essential, this in itself would be of limited utility without further information. What is the use of monitoring interbank transfers that are DES-encrypted? And even if you break the code, or have the keys, what remains is a money amount transferred from one account number at one bank to another account number at another bank. Who owns the accounts? One way of finding out was the CIA method: to sneak agents working under cover as computer hardware or software suppliers into computer rooms. Sometimes a lowly computer programmer has more access to banking information than does a senior executive, so this method could enable one to piece together account names and customer information with account numbers. But such an approach is not efficient. Efficient spying implies access at all times. The evidence indicates that at some point NSA made the logical decision that continual access meant the NSA had to become a major provider of banking software. James R. Norman, Senior Editor at Forbes--in an article entitled "Fostergate," an article scheduled to appear in the May issue of Forbes, but killed at the last minute by Steve Forbes, apparently through the persuasive urging of Casper Weinberger, the former Defense Secretary who is Publisher Emeritus at Forbes--makes specific allegations about several companies which may have become part of such an NSA operation, and about the role of Vincent Foster: "Forbes' sources say that since at least the late 1970s, Foster had been a silent, behind-the-scenes overseer on behalf of the NSA for a small Little Rock, Ark., bank data processing company. Its name was Systematics Inc., launched in 1967 [ 1968? ] and funded and controlled for most of its life by Arkansas billionaire Jackson Stephens, a 1946 Naval Academy graduate. Foster was one of Stephens' trusted deal- makers at the Rose Law Firm, where he was partner with Hillary Rodham Clinton, Webster Hubbell and William Kennedy (whose father was a Systematics director). Hubbell also played an overseer role at Systematics for the NSA for some years according to intelligence sources. Charles O. Morgan, on the other hand, claims omniscience with respect to what did not happen with respect to Systematics.
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